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Abstract 
This article focuses on the International Salvage Convention and the protection of 
the environment in salvage operations. The article traces the evolution and history 
of the law of Salvage to its present status by using the UK as a case study. In 
essence, the article seeks to ascertain the extent of current international regime on 
salvage in protecting the environment. The question that this article poses is: Does 
the International Salvage Convention 1989 accord enough protection to the 
environment against the backdrop of global efforts to promote environmental 
protection and sustainable development? The article begins with a brief synopsis 
of the underlying principles of salvage including the rule of ‘no cure-no pay’ 
followed by an appraisal of the events that culminated arguably in the development 
of the International Salvage Convention 1989 to safeguard the environment in the 
course of salvage operations. A systematic analysis of the defects inherent in the 
International Salvage Convention 1989 vis-à-vis protection of the environment are 
analysed and a number of reforms are highlighted. 
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Introduction 
This article focuses on the International Salvage Convention and the protection 
of the environment in salvage operations. The article traces the evolution and 
history of the law of Salvage to its present status, and it uses the UK as a case 
study. The article seeks to ascertain the extent of current international regime on 
salvage in protecting the environment. The first section focuses on the history 
and evolution of salvage. The modern concept of salvage which can traced to 
the United Kingdom (hereinafter ‘UK’),1 (especially England) hence the city of 
                                           
 Eghosa Osa Ekhator, PhD (Hull), LL.M (Hull), LL.B (Benin); barrister and solicitor of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria. 
1 The origins of salvage are ancient and existed in old legal systems such as the Roman 
epoch amongst others. The Law of Salvage’s core principles were established in the 
nineteenth century and the Admiralty Courts in England played major roles in the modern 
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London occupy special place in the international salvage paradigm. The second 
section briefly discusses the subject matter of salvage. Definitions of terms such 
as ‘vessel’, ‘ship’ or ‘maritime property’ will be elucidated upon. A major 
reason for focusing on these definitions is to highlight the evolution of the 
different meanings ascribed to these terms.  
The third section highlights the three core elements of the law of salvage: 
danger, voluntariness and success. Section 4 focuses on environmental 
protection in salvage operations. Many salvage operations have had negative 
impacts on the environment, thus, this section highlights the role of the 
International Salvage Convention 19892 in protecting the environment. The fifth 
section suggests some reforms to improve protection of the environment in the 
international salvage paradigm. The article also considers if the development of 
a separate environmental salvage award can be the panacea to some of the 
weaknesses in environmental protection in salvage operations.   
1. The History and Evolution of Salvage 
Salvage is traditionally concerned with the salving or preservation of property in 
peril at sea3 and it is unique to maritime law.4 If a person willingly rescues the 
property of another person on land, he gets no reward. However, if the same 
service is performed at sea, the person salving the maritime property, the 
‘salvor’, will be entitled to a reward, not exceeding the value of the property 
salved.5 Salvors are provided special incentives in addition to the compensation 
                                                                                                            
development of the law of Salvage.  Generally, see Olivia Lennox-King (2007) ‘Laying 
the Mark to Port and Starboard: Salvage under duress and Economic duress at Contract 
Law’ 21 Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 31, 32; Catherine Swan (2009) 
‘The Restitutionary and Economic Analyses of Salvage Law’ 23 Australian & New 
Zealand Maritime Law Journal 99. See also George F. Steckley (2014) ‘The Seventeenth-
Century Origins of Modern Salvage Law’ 35(3) The Journal of Legal History 209. Thus, 
some scholars aver that the ‘first recorded salvage dispute dates from 1601’. See Yin-
Cheng Hsu (2016) ‘Developments in International Cultural Heritage Law: What Hampers 
the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.’ 3 Edinburgh 
Student Law Review 116, p. 125. 
2 International Convention on Salvage, 1989. Drafted by the Comite Maritime International 
(CMI) under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Also referred 
to as the Salvage Convention 1989 or the London Salvage Convention. 
  <http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/imo.salvage.convention.1989/doc.html> accessed 1 January 
2015. 
3 Geoffrey Brice (2003) Brice on Maritime Law of Salvage (4thedn, Sweet and Maxwell) 
397.   
4 Ibid. 
5  Simon Baughen (2012) Shipping Law (5th edn, Routledge) p. 274. However, under Article 
8(1) (c) and (d) of the 1989 Convention a salvor, in appropriate circumstances, is required 
to seek assistance and accept the intervention of other salvors’. 
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due to them because of the risks taken in coming to a distressed ship’s aid. 
Kennedy defined salvage in the same vein.6 Brice7 defined salvage as a right 
which: 
arises when a person acting as a volunteer (that is, without any pre – existing 
contractual or other legal duty so to act) preserves or contributes to 
preserving at sea any vessel, cargo, freight or other  recognised subject of 
salvage from danger.8 
In the law of salvage, no matter the efforts of the salvor, if the endeavour is 
unsuccessful, no reward is given. This is the legal reasoning behind the ‘no 
cure-no pay’ doctrine. According to Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘the right to reward, 
rather than remuneration, arises from the fact that salvage is a mixed question of 
a private right and public policy’.9 
The framework of the current law on salvage was first established by the 
decisions of the Admiralty Court in the UK in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.10 During this time, salvage was purely voluntary and more often than 
not, ‘often non-contractual, rendered by ordinary ships that happened to be 
passing the distressed ship.’11 Thus, prior to the end of the nineteenth century, 
express salvage contracts were unknown.12 
Presently, salvage is mainly performed by trained or professional salvors that 
are usually contracted for their services. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, a unique form of contract – Lloyd’s Open Form (hereinafter ‘LOF’) 
evolved and it coincided with the substantial usage of steamships and tugs.13 
                                           
6 DW Steel and Rose FD (1985) Kennedy’s Law of Salvage   (5thedn, Steven and Sons)p.  8. 
7 Brice (2003) supra note 3, p. 1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Aleka Mandaraka–Sheppard Modern Admiralty Law (1stedn, Cavendish) 650. According to 
Richard Shaw & MikisTsimplis (2011) ‘The Liabilities of the Vessel’ in Yvonne Baatz 
(ed), Maritime Law (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) pp.  250-251, who posit that the 
public policy in salvage operations encompasses three elements –‘first, recognising that 
such assistance entitles the salvors of the property to a salvage reward; second, that the 
right to a salvage reward arises at the time of rendering assistance irrespective of any 
contract; and third, that this right is protected by a maritime claim of the highest priority, 
the salvage lien, and a right to arrest the salved property by an action in rem.’ 
10 Baughen, supra note 5, p. 275. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Id., p. 651. 
13 The LOF is a type of contract that is widely used in the international salvage industry. It 
contains the ‘No Cure-No Pay’ principle in salvage operations. The first LOF was 
approved in 1892 and it has been used in the salvage industry for more than one hundred 
years. Generally, the LOF provides for England as the appropriate forum for litigation 
and London for arbitration. However, different types of salvage contracts exist in other 
parts of the world, for example, China, Russia and Japan. See Graham Daines, (2002) 
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Salvage agreements became more common, and by the nineteenth century, a 
Lloyd’s Form of Salvage Agreement ‘No Cure – No Pay’- (sometimes known as 
‘Lloyd’s Standard Form’ or ‘Lloyd’s Open Form’) first came to be used, soon to 
be superseded and improved during the course of the twentieth century, 
culminating in ‘LOF 2000.’14 Furthermore, in 2011, the LOF underwent some 
changes and this is reflected in LOF 2011.15 In The Unique Mariner, Brandon J 
said that the LOF contract has been judicially categorised as one for work or 
labour which is only subject to the principles of Salvage law in so far as these 
have been expressly or impliedly incorporated into it.16 Here, in non-contractual 
(implied) salvage,  
The salvor and salvee owe only minimal duties towards one another. The 
salvor owes a duty of care in respect of any services that it actually 
performs, but it owes no duty to perform those services. It is free to cease 
work at any time it chooses. ... The position is quite different with a 
contractual salvor. … LOF imposes an additional duty on the salvor to use 
its best endeavours to salve the ship and its cargo.17 
The LOF is the most widely used ‘no cure – no pay’ salvage contract. Under a 
LOF contract, in return for salvage services, the salvor receives a proportion of 
the ‘salved value’ (the value of ship, its bunkers and cargo).18 A major 
distinction between the LOF and the traditional principles of salvage is that 
‘under the LOF, salvage is admitted, thereby obviating the need for the salvor to 
show that the vessel was in danger at the time that the agreement was made.’19 
As highlighted above, there have been various updates of the LOF culminating 
in the LOF 2011. The LOF 1980 was the impetus for the development of the 
1989 International Salvage Convention.20 The LOF contained provisions on 
environmental risks and protection in salvage operations and these provisions 
were added to the 1989 Convention. In essence, the LOF protects salvors from 
the hazards or risks inherent in salvage operations by providing them with 
incentives (such as financial incentives) to balance their losses.      
                                                                                                            
‘Lloyd’s Open Form and Special Compensation P & I Clause (SCOPIC)’ 
<http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Graham%20Daines%
20-%20Scopic%20Paper.pdf>. Accessed 10 February 2015. 
14  Brice, supra note 3, p.  5. 
15 Baughen, supra note 5. The changes inherent in the LOF 2011 will be analysed in a 
subsequent section of this article. 
16 The Unique Mariner (No 2) [1979] I Lloyd’s Rep 37. 
17 Baughen, supra note 5, p. 294. 
18 <http://www.marine-salvage.com/overview/index.asp?page=no_cure_no_pay.htm> 
accessed 2 January 2015. 
19 Baughen, supra note 5, p. 274. 
20 Ibid. 
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2. The Subject Matter of Salvage   
Prior to the development of the International Salvage Convention 1989, the 
subject matter of ‘salvage’ as found in English law was vague and ambiguous. 
For example, section 742 of the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act (now abolished)21 
defined a ‘vessel’ to ‘include any ship or boat, or any other description of vessel 
used in navigation not propelled by oars.’ According to Mandaraka-Sheppard, 
this definition was circular and she avers that the definition which entails ‘that a 
vessel includes a ship and a ship includes a vessel does not help much by way of 
definition’.22 Thus, this definition of a ship as encapsulated in the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 was ambiguous and was subjected to diverse meanings or 
interpretations.  
For example, in The Gas Float Whitton (No.2)23 this concerned a structure 
that was shaped like a ship. The House of Lords held that the structure was not a 
ship within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 and also that a 
salvage reward is not available to any person in respect of anything that is not a 
ship, part of a ship or cargo. Marsden criticised this judgment on the basis of it 
not being in accordance with the practice of the Admiralty courts which had 
prevailed for at least three centuries prior to the judgment.24 The decision in The 
Gas Float Whitton (No. 2) is an example of the effect of ambiguity contained in 
the definition of ‘vessel’ in the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act. 
This definition of a vessel has been now discarded. The phrase ‘not propelled 
by oars’ has been omitted from the definition of a ‘ship.’ It was removed by 
virtue of the Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1993,25 enacted into the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995.26 Section 313(1) of the latter Act defines a ship to 
include any vessel used in navigation. The International Salvage Convention 
198927 defines a ship in Article 1(b) to include any ship, craft or any structure 
capable of navigation. 
Other types of traditional maritime property that can be subject to salvage are 
freight and cargo. Cargo is subject to salvage irrespective of whether it is owned 
by a ship owner or by a third party or whether or not it is carried under a bill of 
lading.28 In the Gas Float Whitton (No.2), cargo was held to qualify as a subject 
                                           
21 The Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 
22 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9, p. 15. 
23  [1897] AC 339. 
24 RG Marsden (1899) ‘Admiralty Droits and Salvage-Gas Float Whitton No. II’ L.Q.R 353, 
p. 354. 
25 The Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1993. 
26 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9. 
27Supra note 2. 
28 Baughen, supra note 5.  
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matter of salvage.29 Article 1(c) of the International Salvage Convention 1989 
defines a maritime property as any property not permanently and intentionally 
attached to the shoreline and includes freight at risk. This includes goods or 
merchandise on ships but it is not inclusive of the personal effects of master (or 
crew) and passengers. Article 1(c) of the International Salvage Convention30 
makes freight subject to salvage. Freight is the remuneration due and payable 
for the carriage of cargo and not hire for the use of ships.31 Also, ‘cargo adrift or 
sunken ships’ (ship wrecks) is likewise subject to the law of Salvage.32 
Non–maritime property can also be subject to the law of Salvage. Generally, 
an aircraft cannot be termed a maritime property but it maybe entitled to salvage 
under Section 87(1) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982.33 Similarly, this treatment is 
also extended to hovercrafts by virtue of Sections 1 and 2 of the Hovercraft Act 
1968.34 Here, ships, hovercrafts and other similar structures capable of 
navigation or movement and other such property that are not permanent fixtures 
on shores are subject to the law of Salvage.35  
As a general rule, platforms and drilling units are not subject to salvage by 
virtue of Article 3 of the Salvage Convention 1989.36 However, there are a few 
exceptions to this rule. When such structures are engaged in the act of drilling, 
the law of Salvage is not applicable to such structures; however when such 
platforms or drilling units are in navigation, they become subject to the law of 
Salvage.37 
Furthermore, by virtue of Article 4, of Schedule 11 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1995,38 the International Salvage Convention 198939 does not apply to 
warships or non-commercial vessels owned or operated by a country or State 
and entitled at the time of salvage operations to sovereign immunity under 
international law unless that State allows it. In the UK, Section 230 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 deals with salvage claims by or against the Crown. 
                                           
29 (No.2) [1897] A.C 339. 
30 Baughen, supra note  
31 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9, p. 660. 
32 Institute of Maritime Law (2008) Southampton on Shipping Law (Informa Law) 163. 
33 The Civil Aviation Act 1982. Also, in respect of saving of lives at sea, ‘will not, by itself 
justify a claim for salvage if it is not connected with the salvage of some maritime 
property’ Baughen, supra note 5, p.  277. Also see Ethan Zubic (2010-2011) ‘Pure versus 
Contract Salvage-Narrowing the Scope of an Agreement to Volunteer Bar to Pure 
Salvage.’ 10 Loyola Maritime Law Journal 145, 149-15 
34 The Hovercraft Act 1968. 
35 Institute of Maritime Law, supra note 32.  
36 Supra note 2. 
37 Institute of Maritime Law, supra note 32. 
38 Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
39 Supra note 2. 
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3. Elements of Salvage 
The principal elements of salvage are threefold: danger, voluntariness and 
success.40 
3.1 Danger 
Before, any ship or vessel at sea can be subject to salvage, the ship must be in 
danger. The danger which may be actual or a likelihood of real danger must 
expose the property to the possibility of damage. An apprehension of danger 
will suffice as long it is not a fanciful danger and it does not have to be 
immediate or absolute.41 In the Phantom, Lord Lushington stated, inter alia, that 
– ‘it is not necessary that there should be absolute danger in order to constitute 
salvage services, it is sufficient if there is a state of difficulty, and reasonable 
apprehension’.42 
Danger can be categorised into future or contingent danger and danger to 
third parties or the environment. Future danger is known as the ‘Troilus danger’. 
In the Troilus case, a steamship carrying cargo to Liverpool lost her propeller in 
the Indian Ocean, and therefore accepted assistance from a motor-vessel which 
towed her to safety to Aden where unfortunately she could not be repaired and 
where there were no facilities for discharging and storing the cargo.43 The court 
held that although the ship and cargo were in physical safety at Aden, the 
services in question were salvage services.    
In the case of a danger to third parties, the salvor can claim a reward if he 
successfully prevents damage affecting the interests of a third party. If a salvor 
successfully saves a maritime property and at the same time helps in reducing 
the damage that would have been caused to a third party, he is entitled to a 
reward from the salvee (the owner of the vessel). 
In the area of danger to the environment, Article 1(d) of the Salvage 
Convention states thus: 
                                           
40  Some authors contend that there are more than three principles or elements of salvage. 
Herein, the principles or ingredients of salvage (under customary international law) are 
danger, voluntariness, success, place of rendering the services and the type of property 
salved. For example, see William Tetley (1998)Maritime Liens and Claims, (2nd edn, 
International Shipping Publications) and Natalia Malashkina (2010)Law Reform in the 
International Regime of Salvage: The Insurance Perspective (Master’s Thesis, Lund 
University): 
<http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1698365&fileOId=1
698369>.  Accessed 2 January 2013. 
41 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9, p. 662. 
42 [1866] L.R. 1 A and E 58 at 60. Cited in Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9, p. 663. 
43  [1951] AC 820. 
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[d]amage to the environment means substantial physical damage to human 
health or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas 
adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or 
similar incidents.44 
This aspect of danger to the environment shall be discussed in a detailed manner 
at a later part of this article. 
3.2 Voluntary Services (Voluntariness) 
In the law of salvage, voluntariness means salvage services rendered without 
any prior or pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties.45 
Voluntariness also includes services not done in the line of official duty or for 
self-preservation. As long as the persons are recognised by law as volunteers 
and they render salvage services, they are entitled to salvage remuneration.46 In 
The Sava Star, Clarke J. posited that ‘there are no rigid categories of salvors. 
They include any volunteer who renders services of a salvage nature.’47 
In the International Salvage Convention 1989, there is no express provision 
on the rules guiding voluntariness of salvors in salvage operations.48 However, it 
has been contended that Article 17 of the International Salvage Convention 
1989, by implication lays down rules ‘for the recovery of salvage and certain 
qualifications.’49 The said Article states that: “[n]o payment is due under the 
provisions of the Convention unless services rendered exceed what can be 
reasonably considered as due performance of a contract entered into before the 
danger arose”.  
Voluntary services in salvage operations can manifest in different 
circumstances. An example will suffice at this juncture.50 Generally, in salvage 
operations, individuals (for example, ship’s master and crew) who have entered 
agreements with the ship owner prior to the existence of danger are not 
recognised as salvors.51 The reason is because they have an already existing 
obligation or duty to protect and preserve the ship and cargo.52 In The Neptune, 
Lord Stowell describes a ‘volunteer’ as:  ‘[a] person who, without any particular 
                                           
44 Supra note 2. 
45 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9. 
46 Id., 668. 
47 [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep, 141. Also cited in Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9, p.  668. 
48  Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note9; Francis D. Rose (2002) Kennedy and Rose: The Law 
of Salvage (6thedn, Sweet & Maxwell) 243. 
49  Rose, Id, p.  242. 
50  For an extensive analysis of voluntary services in salvage operations, see Mandaraka-
Sheppard, supra note 9, pp. 668-683 and Rose, supra note 48, pp.  243-265. 
51 Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9). 
52 Ibid. 
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relation to ship in distress, proffers useful service, and gives it as a volunteer 
adventurer, without any pre-existing covenant that connected him with the duty 
of employing himself for the preservation of that ship.’53 
However, this rule that individuals with contractual agreements with a ship 
owner cannot be volunteers is subject to some exceptions.  For example, in The 
Demetrio, the court held that the plaintiffs who were crew members in a vessel 
that was attacked and abandoned as a result of the orders of the captain were 
entitled to salvage rewards after they successfully extinguished the fire on the 
ship at great risks to their safety.54 
3.3 Success 
This is the most important element of a salvage operation. Traditionally, if a 
salvage operation is not successful, the salvor is not entitled to reward. This 
doctrine is known as the ‘No Cure – No Pay’ doctrine. Thus, the principles of 
traditional salvage did not provide for an award for environmental protection 
where no property was saved.55 
However, the 1989 Salvage Convention recognizes the need to protect the 
environment in its provisions. For example, the preamble to the Convention 
highlights the need to protect the environment. Also, by virtue of Article 13(b) 
of the International Salvage Convention, the skill and effort of the salvors in 
preventing or minimising damage to the environment may be a factor in 
determining a salvage award. Thus, the protection of the environment in salvage 
operations is an exception to this principle of ‘No cure – No pay’. It will be 
addressed in the fourth section of this article. 
3.3.1 No Cure – No Pay Doctrine 
The justification of the principle is the payment from the salvaged property and 
not the successful salving of the property. If the vessel in distress is lost or 
destroyed during the salvage operation, no reward will be awarded. The reason 
behind the principle is that; the salvage award is paid out of the salved property. 
If the vessel is destroyed, there would be no basis for any payment to be made to 
the salvor. 
Even if a distressed vessel was rescued from peril at sea, a salvor who claims 
a salvage reward must prove that he has contributed to the vessel being rescued 
or salved. This principle was amplified by Lord Phillimorein SS Melanie v. SS 
                                           
53 (1824) 1 Hagg. 227. 
54 (1941) 69 LIL Rep 5. 
55 Gary Beale (2014) ‘Environmental Salvage and the 1989 Salvage Convention: Proposed 
Amendments to the Convention and Difficulties in Quantifying an Environmental Salvage 
Award’ 16 (4) Environmental Law Review 248. 
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San Onofre56 who stated that “success is necessary for a salvage award. 
Contributions to that success, or as it is sometime expressed meritorious 
contributions to that success, give title to salvage reward”.57 
In Marguerite Molinos, a life boat which sent out telegraphs to tugs before 
going to rescue a distressed vessel was held not to be entitled to a salvage 
reward.58 Here, the onus of proof fell on the life boat crew who had gone out for 
the purposes of saving lives to prove that they were entitled to the salvage 
reward against the property in peril or salved. In this case, the life boat crew 
members were considered not to be salvors. The basis for this decision was that 
the message in the telegraph was not instrumental in salving the property. This 
principle can sometimes lead to or perpetuate injustice.59 This was exemplified 
in the ‘1979 incident of The Aegean Captain and The Atlantic Express. The 
salvors prevented an oil spill washing up on the beaches of Tobago by towing a 
badly leaking and ablaze Atlantic Empress far out to sea. The ship then exploded 
and sank. The salvors received no reward.’60 
In The Benlarig, a vessel which was damaged in a salvage operation was 
held not to be entitled to any salvage reward.61The master of the salvor vessel 
proceeded to Gibraltar (wherein the distressed vessel was expected to be towed 
to) and gave information on the location and condition of the distressed vessel. 
The efforts of the salving vessel and the information provided by the master to 
the subsequent salvor were not considered by the court. Thus, the court held that 
the original salvor was not entitled to a salvage reward in the salvage operations 
which left the distressed vessel in a more precarious condition.62 However, in 
The Cameillia, the court held that if a distressed vessel is left at a place of 
safety, the original salvor may be entitled to a salvage reward if the distressed 
vessel is ultimately salved.63 
Fortunately, there is an exception to the No cure-No pay principle. The 
exception is that when a distressed vessel calls for assistance, any vessel that 
heeds to such a call –even though it does not contribute to the eventual salving 
of the vessel– is entitled to a salvage award. The rationale for this can be 
gleaned from the dicta of Lushington in The Undaunted where he stated that – 
‘[t]he engagement to render assistance to a vessel in distress, and the 
                                           
56  [1925] A.C. 246. 
57  Id., 262. 
58  [1903] P. 160 cited in NJJ Gaskell and others (1987)‘Chorley and Giles’ Shipping Law 
(8edn, Financial Times Management)p. 441. 
59  Baughen, supra note 5, p.  287. 
60  Beale, supra note 55, p.  249. 
61  (1888) 14 PD 3 cited in Baughen, supra note 5, p. 283. 
62  Baughen, supra note 5. 
63 (1883) 9 PD 27 cited in Baughen, supra note 5, p. 283. 
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performance of that agreement so far as necessary or far as possible, establish a 
title to salvage reward’.64 
The principle of ‘No Cure - No Pay’ has caused a lot of difficulties to 
professional salvors in the salvage industry. Salvors were naturally against it, 
especially since they received no reward after spending money and resources on 
the salvage operations, despite the salvage operation being unsuccessful. There 
is also no reward for salvors ‘for attending a mid-ocean casualty which did not 
cause a threat of damage to the environment in coastal or adjacent waters’.65 
This principle of ‘No Cure No Pay’ has also been somewhat mitigated 
particularly in the area of environmental protection which shall be explained in 
further detail in the next part of this article. 
4. Protection of the Environment and Salvage Operations 
There exists an exception against the rigid principle of ‘No Cure – No Pay’ 
which relates to the efforts of salvors in preventing damage to the environment 
from oil laden ships. The problems associated with the salvage of oil laden ships 
are numerous. For example, oil may escape during salvage operations and the 
salvors may be held culpable for the resultant environmental pollution.66 
Furthermore, due to the fear of the environmental impacts of salvage operations 
involving oil laden ships, it is common practice that governments of coastal 
states refuse to provide places of refuge to such vessels. Consequently, salvors 
are left with the option of towing the stricken vessels into the far recesses of the 
oceans to sink such vessels and this might lead to negative environmental 
impacts on nearby coastal States.67  
Salvors may lose the salvage rewards if the salvage operation is unsuccessful 
and in some instances when the salvage operation is successful, the worth of the 
salved property may serve as a disincentive for salvors to undertake such (risky) 
                                           
64  (1860) Lush 92 (Dr Lushington) cited in Baughen, supra note 5, p. 283.  
65 Colin de la Rue and Charles B Anderson (2012) ‘Environnemental Salvage – Plus ca 
change…?’ 18 JIML 285. Presently, salvors are entitled to some reward if they 
successfully prevent damage (from oil laden ships) to the environment.  
66 Baughen, supra note 5. 
67 Archie Bishop (2012) ‘The Development of Environmental Salvage and Review of the 
London Salvage Convention 1989’ (2012) 37 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 65. This 
refusal by governments to provide places of refuge for such vessels is termed ‘the 
Maritime Leper Syndrome’. Thus, ‘coastal States have often refused to grant places of 
refuge for ships where there was a risk of marine pollution to the offshore environment.’ 
See Yosifumi Tanaka (2014) ‘Key Elements in International Law Governing Places of 
Refuge for Ships: Protection of Human Life, State Interests, and Marine Environment’ 45 
Journal of Maritime & Commerce 157, 158. Professor Tanaka also highlights the 
examples wherein coastal States have refused to provide places of refuge for ships. 
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salvage operations.68 Arguably, this is because salvors will lose their reward 
since they have to sink the ship, so they would not be interested in salving a 
vessel that poses an environmental threat so they are unwilling to help such 
vessels without an exception to the ‘no-cure no pay’ principle. 
During the last century, larger steamships have been built for the carriage of 
hazardous materials over the sea. This development has led to many incidents of 
pollution. The first major pollution incident that occurred was the Torrey 
Canyon disaster in 1967; it involved a Liberian oil vessel which spilled more 
than a million barrels of oil as a result of its grounding near the south west of 
England.69 The tugs that were engaged to salve the tanker were unsuccessful. 
Inevitably, the salvors could not claim salvage because they did not salve the 
vessel.70 
 A worse incident took place in 1978 in the Amoco Cadiz case which centred 
on a very large crude carrier (hereinafter ‘VLCC’).71 During a trip to Rotterdam, 
its steering gear failed and it broke in half spilling 223,000 tonnes of crude oil. 
The oil spill spread across 125 miles off the coast of Brittany, destroying 
fisheries, oyster and seaweed beds, and polluting beaches despite the efforts of 
10,000 French soldiers deployed to clean the beach.72 According to Redgwell, 
the Amoco Cadizdisaster gave the impetus for a number of changes in the law of 
Salvage.73 A lot of pressure was exerted by salvors seeking rewards 
commensurate with their services rendered and coastal states seeking to avoid 
environmental disasters.74 This prompted an immediate response within the 
Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organisation (hereinafter 
‘IMO’),which culminated –in 1989– with the adoption of a new International 
Convention on Salvage,75 remedying the inherent weaknesses of the International 
Salvage Convention 1910 (also known as the Brussels Convention) which 
provided for a strict ‘no cure-no pay’ salvage regime. 
In 1980, as a result of the perceived weaknesses76 of the Brussels 
Convention, the LOF198077 England introduced two concepts. These concepts 
                                           
68 Baughen, supra note 5. 
69 Generally see Bishop, supra note 67. 
70  Barracuda Tanker Corporation and Union Oil Company of California v United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Republic of France and States of Guernsey ('The 
Torrey Canyon') [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep 591. 
71  The 'Amoco Cadiz' [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep 304.  
72 <http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/ships/html/sh_005000_amoco cadiz.htm>. 
Accessed 9 September 2014. 
73  Catherine Redgwell (1990) ‘The Greening of Salvage Law’ 14 (2) Marine Policy 142.  
74 Id., 146. 
75 Id., 142. 
76 Due to the ‘no cure-no pay’ doctrine and non-protection of environment during salvage 
operations amongst others, the Brussels Convention was deemed a failure by various 
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were known as ‘enhanced award’ and ‘safety net.’ Both concepts are only 
applicable in salvage or attempted salvage operations of oil tankers, oil laden 
ships and tankers with cargo of oil.78 The safety net guaranteed the payment of 
salvors’ expenses if the value of the salved property was inadequate to offset the 
salvage reward and a salvor may also receive an increment of fifteen percent of 
his expenses if he has succeeded in minimising or preventing environmental 
pollution.79 The safety net was payable by the owners of the ships. A salvor’s 
award is ‘enhanced’ if he saved maritime property in addition to preventing 
pollution. However, the concepts were only used in the salvage of oil laden 
ships. 
The uniqueness of these concepts was that they departed from the general 
rule of ‘No Cure – No Pay’ by providing incentives to the salvors. These 
provisions introduced into Article 1 of the Lloyd’s Form include a specific 
agreement on the part of the contractor (salvor) to use his best endeavours to 
prevent the escape of oil from the vessel while performing the services of 
salving the vessel, cargo, bunkers and stores.80 The ‘best endeavours’ obligation 
of salvors is replicated in the recent LOF 2011, the Special Compensation 
Protection and Indemnity Club Clause (hereinafter SCOPIC)81 agreement and 
clause 4.6 of the Lloyds Standard Salvage and Arbitration Clauses (hereinafter 
‘LSSA Clauses’).82 
There is a conundrum as to the ‘precise meaning of best endeavours’83 as 
encapsulated in the LOF. Rhidian Thomas argues that the ‘best endeavours’ 
principle  might be subject to diverse interpretations or linguistic formulations 
such as ‘reasonable care’, ‘due care’, ‘reasonable endeavours’ and ‘all 
reasonable endeavours as amplified in Article 8(1) of the International Salvage 
Convention 1989.84 Unfortunately, courts in the UK are yet to elucidate on ‘best 
                                                                                                            
stakeholders in the maritime industry. SeeMalashkina,supra note 40for an analysis of the 
Brussels Convention. 
77 Lloyd’s Open Form 1980. 
78 Baughen, supra note 5. 
79 <http://www.marine-salvage.com/overview/index.asp?page=no_cure_no_pay.htm> . 
Accessed 2 January 2013. 
80   Richard Shaw (1996) ‘The 1989 Salvage Convention and the English Law’ Lloyds 
Maritime & Commercial Law Quarterly 202, 205. 
81 Special Compensation P and I Club Clause (SCOPIC) was developed to mitigate the 
harshness of art 14 of the 1989 Salvage Convention. SCOPIC will be analysed in the next 
part of this article. 
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endeavours’ in salvage cases. Recourse can be found in judicial authorities in 
other areas of law wherein ‘best endeavours’ were the focus of UK Courts.85 
 In 1989, the International Convention on Salvage was formally agreed upon 
in London. It came into force internationally on 1 July 1996. However, it was 
enacted into English Law by the Merchant Shipping (Salvage and Pollution) Act 
199486 and this came into force in the UK on 1 January 1995. In the UK, parties 
can contract out of the Act, or part of it, notwithstanding any contractual 
provision.87 The Salvage Convention is the basis or foundation of the various 
statutes governing the law of Salvage in the UK. 
Under the International Salvage Convention 1989, the key Articles 
concerned with environmental protection are 1, 8, 12, 13 and 14.  Article 1 
defines ‘damage to the environment’ as ‘substantial physical damage to human 
health or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent 
thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or similar major 
incidents.’ This definition is different from the one found in Salvage Convention 
1910 on the basis that ‘damage to environment’ has been extended to other 
hazardous substances apart from oil.88 The damage must also have occurred in 
coastal areas or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto. Arguably if pollution 
occurs on the high seas, the 1989 Convention will not be applicable. 
A major flaw89 is the phrase, ‘Damage to the Environment’ – Substantial 
Physical Damage’ contained in Article 1(d) of the Convention.  Brice90 posits 
that it is intended to exclude trivial damage. Thus, it must also be of a “physical 
character and presumably eliminates cases where the only environmental harm 
                                           
85 Ibid. There have been different interpretation of ‘best endeavours’ by the courts in the 
UK. For example, in Overseas Buyers Ltd v Granadex SA [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 608, 613, 
the court construed ‘best endeavours’ as ‘doing all that can reasonably be expected’, also 
cited in Thomas (n 82). Also see Rhodia International Holdings Ltd v Huntsman 
International LLC [2007] 2 ALL ER (Comm) 577. This article adopts the view of 
Thomas in respect of ‘best endeavours’ in salvage operations ‘will be influenced and 
shaped by the wider legal and contractual context. For example, under Article 8(1)(c) and 
(d) of the 1989 Convention a salvor, in appropriate circumstances, is required to seek 
assistance and accept the intervention of other salvors’ Thomas, supra note 82, p.  181 
86  The Merchant Shipping (Salvage and Pollution) Act 1994. 
87 This is by virtue of Article 6, Schedule 11 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 
88 The 1910 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating 
to Assistance and Salvage at Sea. Adopted in Brussels, Belgium on 23 September, 1910. 
<http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/salvage1910.html> 
89 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9, p. 735. 
90  Brice, supra note 3, p. 424. 
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alleged involves loss of visual amenity, e.g. due to the presence of an unsightly 
wreck in an area of beauty”.91 
However, the Comite Maritime International (hereinafter ‘CMI’)92 report 
provides some insight as to what ‘substantial physical damage’ refers to. It 
states thus: 
it is intended to make it clear that the definition does not include damage to 
any particular person or installation. There must be risk of damage of a more 
general nature in the area concerned. It must be a risk of substantial 
damage.93 
In the author’s opinion, another flaw is the use of the phrase ‘Coastal or Inland 
Waters’ by virtue of Article 1(d) of the Convention. This particular provision in 
the author’s view is too restrictive by expressly mentioning coastal or inland 
waters; it excludes other types of navigable waters including territorial seas, 
exclusive economic zones and international waters. Therefore, the Convention is 
not applicable to exclusive economic zones, high (territorial) seas and 
international waters amongst others. Furthermore, in the UK, salvage operations 
in inland waters wherein the vessels are used for inland navigation and salvage 
operations in inland waters (where no ships are involved) are expressly excluded 
from the scope of application of the Salvage Convention 1989 by virtue of 
Schedule 11 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.94 This restriction or reservation 
entered by the UK in respect of salvage operations in inland waters will be 
disincentive in salvage matters brought before English Court or tribunals 
because such cases will be decided on the basis of English Law and not the 
Salvage Convention. 
Article 8(1) of the1989 Convention, states that a salvor in performing the 
duties specified in sub-paragraph (a) must carry out the salvage operations with 
due care and (b) is required to exercise due care to prevent or minimize damage 
to the environment. Moreover, Article 8(2)(b) states that the owner of a ship 
                                           
91 Colin De La Rue & Charles Anderson (1998) Shipping and the Environment – Law and 
Practice (1stedn, LLP) 578.   
92  Cited in Brice, supra note 3, p.  424. The CMI is a non-governmental not for profit 
international organization established in Antwerp, Belgium in 1897, whose major 
objective is development and unification of maritime law in all respects. The CMI played 
major roles in the development and drafting of the extant International Salvage 
Convention 1989. See CMI website at:  
    <http://www.comitemaritime.org/Home/0,271,1132,00.html> 
93  CMI Report to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) on the draft international 
convention on salvage approved by XXXII International Conference of the CMI held in 
Montreal, May 1981. Cited in Brice supra note 3, p. 424. 
94 Schedule 11 Part II, s.2 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 in Richard Shaw & Mikis 
Tsimplis supra note 9, p. 252. 
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must also exercise due care to prevent or minimise damage to the environment. 
Article 12(1) states that successful salvage operations are entitled to a reward. 
Thus, salvors are supposed to consider the impact of their salvage activities on 
the environment 
It can be contended that a salvor can be held accountable by virtue of 
Articles 18 and 14(5) if his action of saving a ship causes damage to the 
environment.  Article 18 states that: ‘A salvor may be deprived of the whole or 
part of the payment due under this Convention to the extent that the salvage 
operations have become necessary or more difficult because of fault or neglect 
on his part or if the salvor has been guilty of fraud or other dishonest conduct.’ 
Also Article 14(5) provides that: ‘If the salvor has been negligent and has 
thereby failed to prevent or minimise damage to the environment, he may be 
deprived of the whole or part of any special compensation due under this 
article.’ Baughen argues that ‘[a]lthough neither Article refers to the possibility 
that misconduct may expose the salvor to a liability in damages exceeding the 
amount of any salvage award, their language is not such as to exclude liability 
under Art 8(1) as an additional consequence of salvorial misconduct.’95 
Articles 13 and 14 form the fulcrum of environmental protection in the 
Convention. The provisions contain modified versions of the enhanced and 
safety net awards.96 Article 13 lists out the indexes relevant for the calculation 
of salvage remuneration. According to one of these indexes, the ‘skills and 
efforts of salvors in preventing damage to the environment’97 would be taken 
into account in assessing property salvaged by way of an enhanced award.98 
Arguably, the basis for this provision is to encourage salvors to go and assist 
ships that threaten the environment.99 Thus, the salvors must prove that they 
actually prevented damage to the environment.100 Here, the salvors will not be 
entitled to any reward under this provision ‘if those efforts turn out to be of no 
avail.’101 
By virtue of Article 13(2), payment of the reward must be in proportion to 
the respective values of salved property. In the UK, in tandem with the proviso 
in Article 13(2), Article 4 of Part II, Schedule 11 of Merchant Shipping Act 
1995 states – there is no obligation to fix a reward up to the maximum salved 
value under Article 13 before assessing special compensation to be paid. The 
underwriters of ship and cargo pay the award accruing from this provision, 
                                           
95 Baughen, supra note 5, p. 292. 
96 Id., p. 285. 
97 Supra, note 2, art 13(1) (b). 
98 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9, p. 731. 
99 Bishop, supra note 67, p. 68. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Baughen, supra note 5, p. 286. 
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notwithstanding that they do not insure a vessel owner for damage to the 
environment.102 
Furthermore, Article 13(3) states that the reward shall not exceed the value of 
the vessel and other property. The value of the reward will be affected by the 
value of the property salved.103 Thus, in cases where there ‘is a threat of damage 
to the environment, values of the salved property are often low and the expense 
of salvage high.’104 Arguably, this provision will be a disincentive to salvors in 
salvage operations. 
Article 14 creates a completely new extra-contractual legal right of recovery 
and it is known as Special Compensation provision.105 Special Compensation 
under Article 14 is said to be: 
the most significant modification introduced by the 1989 Salvage Convention 
in the Law of Salvage and aims at providing incentives for the salvors to get 
involved in incidents where pollution is threatened, even if there is a risk that 
very little or no property will be eventually salved.106 
A salvor is entitled to special compensation under Article 14 (1) if he does not 
get rewarded under Article 13 in respect of a vessel or cargo which threatened 
the environment. Under Article 14(2), if a salvor prevented or minimised 
damage to the environment, the special compensation payable by the owner may 
be increased to a maximum of thirty percent of expenses incurred by salvor. A 
tribunal may however further increase it but shall not exceed one hundred 
percent of expenses incurred by salvor. The expenses incurred by the salvors are 
termed ‘out of pocket’ expenses and are guided by the provisions of Article 
14(3) of the Convention. It is been contended that ‘out of pocket’ expenses of 
salvors are “fairly easily ascertained.’107 It could entail the ‘out of pocket 
expenses’ or monies reasonably incurred by a salvor for the equipment and 
personnel used in the salvage operation. For example, this may include monies 
or expenses expended on the hire of salvage equipment or fuel (petrol oil) 
consumed during the course of the salvage operation.108 
Article 14(4) states that special compensation shall be paid to the salvor if it 
is greater than any reward recoverable by the salvor under Article 13.109 Here, 
special compensation is akin to a ‘safety net, wherein ‘a minimum payment to 
                                           
102 Bishop, supra note 67, p. 68 
103 Id., p. 67. 
104 Id., p. 68 
105 Shaw, supra note 80, p. 217. 
106 Shaw & Tsimplis, supra note 9, p. 257. 
107 Bishop, supra note 67, p. 73. 
108 Ibid. 
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the salvor, one that took away some of the risk endemic in a “no cure no pay” 
situation’.110 The amount paid as special compensation is the amount of 
‘assessed compensation that is greater than any salvage reward recoverable (not 
recovered) under Article 13’.111 Under Article 14, only the ship owner is liable 
for the payment of the special compensation to salvors. This is unlike the 
scenario under Article 13, wherein the ship, cargo and freight owners among 
other relevant parties will be liable for the payment of the salvage reward. 
In 1991, a tanker, named the ABT Summer caught fire and exploded in the 
mid-Atlantic off Central Africa.112 The salvors who rescued the vessel were held 
not entitled to special compensation on the basis that the leaking oil did not 
cause damage to the environment within the meaning of Article 1(d) of Salvage 
Convention 1989.113 In so far as this provision remains, it will serve as a 
disincentive to salvors in rescuing ships on navigable waters not expressly 
mentioned in the Convention. Willmer QC posits that having regard to the 
prevailing wind and current, a ship spilling thousands of tons of oil or noxious 
chemicals, even though far out at sea, nevertheless threatened to damage marine 
life or resources in coastal waters or areas thereto.114 This view is well-reasoned 
and in the author’s opinion, the correct view. 
An inherent weakness in the Convention is ‘threatened damage’ which is 
found in Article 14(1) of the International Salvage Convention 1989. Arguably, 
this phrase is ambiguous, and it has argued whether a real danger or an 
apprehension of danger is sufficient. If a circumstance was erroneously 
suspected of being dangerous, one would have to assess whether such error was 
reasonable or not at the relevant time.115 Lloyd’s arbitrators treat ‘threatened 
damage’ to mean the existence of ‘a reasonable apprehension of a danger of 
such damage at the time of the salvor’s initial response.’116 The probable reason 
behind this approach is for it to act as an incentive to salvors. 
Another disincentive in the International Salvage Convention 1989 is the use 
of the phrase ‘out of pocket expenses.’ Article 14(3) of the Convention is very 
problematic and controversial. The provision states: 
Salvor's expenses for the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2 means out-of-pocket 
expenses reasonably incurred by the salvor in the salvage operation and a fair 
                                           
110 Bishop, supra note 67, 74. 
111 Ibid. 
112  Cited in Shaw, supra note 80, p. 209. 
113  Ibid. 
114  John Willmer, (Q.C) ‘Salvage and Current Legal Problems’ cited in Mandaraka-
Sheppard, supra note 9, p. 735. 
115  De La Rue &Anderson, supra note 65, p. 587. 
116 Willmer, J (QC) ‘Salvage and Current Legal Problems’ (1997) (Public Lecture at London 
Shipping Law Centre) 13. Also cited in De La Rue & Anderson, supra note 65, p. 588.  
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rate for equipment and personnel actually used in the salvage operation, 
taking into consideration the criteria set out in Article 13, paragraph 1 (h), (i) 
and (j). 
The issue of out-of-pocket expenses arose in the case of the Nagasaki Spirit, 
where the Court referred to the fair rate of equipment.117At this point, the “issue 
was whether in assessing a ‘fair rate’ for the salvor’s own craft, equipment, 
personnel, etc, it was permissible to include a market or profitable rate, or 
whether the salvor was entitled solely to reimbursement of expenditure”.118 
The House of Lords in affirming the decisions of the lower Courts held that 
‘out-of-pocket expenses’ means a fair rate of expenditure and that profitability is 
not a criterion in calculating the remuneration. Lord Mustill described the 
intention of the legislation as follows: 
 [t]he only structural change in the scheme is that the incentive is now made 
more attractive by the possibility of obtaining new financial recognition for 
conferring a new type of incidental benefit.119 
Salvors were in disagreement with the way in which the remuneration was 
computed in The Nagasaki Spirit to their detriment for a number of reasons. 
Salvors contended that the decision in The Nagasaki Spirit disregarded the 
losses suffered by them in maintaining their (very expensive) specialist 
equipment in preparation for salvage operations until danger to the environment 
is eliminated.120 The salvors’ contention was that: ‘such advance capital 
provision cannot be compensated, in their opinion, without allowance of an 
element of profit in the fair rate of Article 14’.121 In the author’s view, Article 14 
of the International Salvage Convention 1989 was inelegantly drafted and this 
led to its diverse interpretations. Lord Mustill who defended his judgement at a 
debate held at the London Shipping Law Centre on 19 June 1997averred that the 
draftsmen of the Convention were to blame because ‘he was only the pianist 
who had to perform the music composed by someone else.’122 
To resolve the challenges induced by the provisions of Article 14 of the 
International Salvage Convention 1989, the maritime industry (salvors, 
protection and indemnity clubs, insurers, and other parties) came up with a 
unique solution; Special Compensation P and I Club Clause (SCOPIC). SCOPIC 
is a framework or agreement between salvors and ship owners for assessing 
remuneration based on pre-agreed rates. It can be invoked at any time and the 
                                           
117  [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Law Rep 323. 
118  Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9, p. 732. 
119  [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 323 at 333, 
120 Mandaraka-Sheppard, supra note 9. 
121  Id., p. 734. 
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parties may contract out of the Convention by incorporating the agreement into 
the LOF contract, so this dispenses with the assessment procedures in Article 14 
of the Convention.  
SCOPIC came into effect in August 1999.123 One of the distinctive features 
of the SCOPIC is that ship owners may appoint a Special Casualty 
Representative (hereinafter ‘SCR’) who is an independent expert or adviser to 
the owner and to report on the salvage operations.124 The salvage master or 
salvor is in charge of the salvage operation; however the SCR plays major roles 
in the operation. For example, the SCR is expected to send daily dissenting 
report to the ship owner if he does not agree with the daily reports prepared and 
sent to the ship owner by the salvage master.125 Thus, the presence of the SCR is 
expected to improve transparency in the salvage operation thereby preventing 
unscrupulous salvors from increasing their remuneration or reward.126 However, 
the major inherent disincentive is that the SCR owe his or her allegiance to the 
ship owner and not the salvors. 
From its inception in 1999 to March 2007, there were 844 LOF cases, of 
which 165 incorporated the SCOPIC clause and it has been invoked on 182 
occasions, however, only five SCOPIC cases have gone to arbitration.127 In 
April 2011, there were 1085 LOF cases; herein, the SCOPIC clause was invoked 
on 255 occasions and only seven were SCOPIC related arbitration cases.128 As 
                                           
123 <http://www.marine-salvage.com/overview/index.asp?page=no_cure_no_pay.htm> 
accessed 13 January 2013. SCOPIC was revised in 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2014. See 
<http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/the%20market/tools%20and%20resources/agency
/salvage%20arbitration%20branch/scopic%202014.pdf>. Generally see IlianDjadjev 
(2015) The SCOPIC clause as a major development in salvage law.’ Available at SSRN 
2627798  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2627798> 
124  Shaw & Tsimplis, supra note 9.  See De la Rue & Anderson, supra note 65, p.  286,  for 
other significant features of the SCOPIC Clause which include:  
    ‘that [the] SCOPIC remuneration is to be paid irrespective of any threat of damage to 
the environment; detailed tariff rates for craft, equipment and personnel employed in 
providing salvage services; a [twenty-five] per cent uplift on these amounts to be paid 
in all cases, regardless of success or failure; arrangements for security to be given for 
the remuneration due; and provision for rates to be reviewed on a regular basis. 
Increases have been made on a number of occasions, most recently in 2010.’ 
125 Archie Bishop ‘The Mystery of the SCOPIC’. <http://www.marine-
salvage.com/pdfs/ThemysteryofSCOPICunravelled.pdf> accessed 18 March 2013. 
126 Shaw & Tsimplis, supra note 9. 
127 Ibid. 
128 See Bishop, supra note 67. Also see LOF Statistics at <http://www.lloyds.com/the-
market/tools-and-resources/lloyds-agency-department/salvage-arbitration-branch/lof-
statistics>. Accessed: 2 January 2013. For the current statistics on SCOPIC, see 
<http://www.lloyds.com/the-market/tools-and-resources/lloyds-agency-
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at the end of September 2015, SCOPIC was invoked in 12 out of the 50 new 
cases in 2015.  
The Fixed Cost Arbitration Procedure (hereinafter ‘FCAP’) (which started on 
3 May 2005) was introduced as an alternative procedure to the established 
Lloyd’s salvage arbitration and it was as a result of complaints about the 
expenses and complexity of the LOF salvage arbitration.129 The falling use of 
the LOF contract was a factor for establishing the FCAP.130 
5. Proposed Reforms 
From the analysis of the problems associated with some provisions regarding 
environmental protection in the Convention, reforms are urgently required to 
remedy its inherent weaknesses. Firstly, SCOPIC should be strengthened by 
making it part of the International Salvage Convention 1989. This can be done 
by way of an amendment to the Convention by incorporating SCOPIC which is 
presently a voluntary agreement into it. By making it part of the Convention, it 
will become mandatory for every ratifying State to abide by it.  
The FCAP is an optional guide to arbitrators and therefore the choice 
between the LOF salvage arbitration and FCAP will be determined by the 
parties or in the event of default, by the arbitrator.131 Accordingly, ‘the essence 
of the new FCAP procedure is that it is a fixed cost arbitration conducted 
speedily on the basis of evidence only’.132 The FCAP is necessary to remedy the 
deficiencies of the ‘LOF’, the onus is on the salvage industry to make use of it. 
The author strongly supports the FCAP as an alternative to the LOF arbitration 
process. 
Article 1 of Salvage Convention 1989 which limits the jurisdiction of 
environmental salvage to ‘coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto’ 
should be reformed. This provision should be rectified by adding the high seas, 
exclusive economic zones and international waters amongst others. This was the 
position in the LOF 1980 which extended pollution damage to include those 
from vessels in the high seas. The present position in the Convention serves as a 
serious disincentive to would-be salvors in the high seas, because they are not 
entitled to environmental salvage remuneration in the high seas.  
                                                                                                            
department/salvage-arbitration-branch/lof-statistics> Thus, as at the end of September 
2015, SCOPIC was invoked in 12 out of the 50 new cases in 2015. 
129 Editorial -‘LOF salvage – new fixed cost arbitration procedure (FCAP)’ (2005) 11 (3) 
JIML169. Thus, the FCAP ‘allows for a documents-only arbitration process.’ Djadjev 
supra note 123, p .3. 
130  Id., p.  169. 
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132  Ibid. 
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Historically, ships can enter the nearest ports, bays, or other waters located 
within the sovereignty of a coastal state to avoid storms and repairs,133 and under 
customary international law foreign vessels in distress have a right to seek 
refuge in the ports or waters that were not the intended destination.134 
Unfortunately, this rule is not the norm in salvage operations affecting the 
environment. In the Irish case of MV Toledo, the court held that even though the 
right to refuge exists, a state has the power to legally refuse the entry of a ship if 
it poses significant harm to the state or its citizens.135 Thus, refusing entry to 
such ships in distress may lead to such ships discharging their oil waste in the 
high seas, thus leading to severe environmental consequences for other nearby 
States. 
 To mitigate this problem, the IMO has adopted two resolutions to the 
effect.136 The first is Resolution A.949 (23) Guidelines on Places of Refuge for 
Ships in Need of Assistance137 which is used when a ship is in need of help but 
safety of life is not involved. It recognises that if a ship is involved in an 
accident, the solution is to transfer its cargo and bunkers and repair it at the 
place of refuge.138 States might object to it on the basis of environmental and 
economic reasons.139 For example, if the environmental and economic impact of 
such vessels on the country of refuge is deemed to be detrimental to the interests 
of that country, it may deny (the stricken vessel) entrance to its waters. This is 
because tourism, vegetation and animals in such waters will be negatively 
affected if the sea shore or coastal area is affected by oil pollution. In The 
Prestige ship disaster, the Spanish Government ordered it away from its coast140 
which unfortunately led to worse pollution occurring than earlier feared. Thus, 
States make such decisions on a case-by-case basis and ‘consideration would 
need to be given to balancing the interests of the affected ship with those of the 
environment’.141 
                                           
133  Aldo Chircop (2002) ‘Ships in Distress, Environmental Threats to Costal States, and 
Places of Refuge: New Directions for an Ancien Regime? 33 (2) Ocean Development & 
International Law 207, 208.    
134 Id., p.  209. 
135 Cited in ibid p.  215. 
136 <http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=746> 
137 Resolution A. 949 (23). Adopted on 5 December 2003 (Agenda item 7) Guidelines on 
Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance. Text of the resolution is available 
online at the IMO website at:  
    <http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=9042&filename=949.pdf> 
138 Chicop, supra note 133. 
139  Ibid. 
140 Shaw & Tsimplis, supra note 9. 
141 Aleka Mandaraka–Sheppard (2007) Modern Maritime Law (2nd edn, Routledge-
Cavendish) p. 717.Thus, Allison argues that a new international convention is required to 
Protection of the Environment and the International Salvage Convention, 1989                   95 
 
 
The second resolution is A.950 (23) Maritime Assistance Services (MAS)142 
which advises that all coastal States should establish a Maritime Assistance 
Service (hereinafter ‘MAS’). The functions of MAS would be to receive reports, 
monitor a ship situation and it will “serve as a point of contact between those in 
salvage operations undertaken by private facilities if the coastal State considers 
that it should monitor all phases of the operation”.143 
The major flaw of the two Resolutions is that they are non-binding on States; 
thus they are mere recommendations. These guidelines may be used in the 
future as a basis of harmonising State policies on places of refuge. For example, 
it can be contended that these aforementioned guidelines are the inspiration for 
the place of refuge in salvage operations in the UK. In the UK, the Secretary of 
State’s Representative (hereinafter ‘SOSREP’) has ‘the powers to oversee and 
control and intervene in salvage operations within UK waters involving vessels 
or fixed platforms where there is significant risk of pollution.’144  
The SOSREP is appointed by the Secretary of State on behalf of the UK 
Government.145 The powers of the SOSREP are enunciated in Schedule 3A of 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 as amended by the Marine Safety Act 2003.146 
The SOSREP or the Maritime and Coastguard Agency have the task of directing 
                                                                                                            
provide certainty as to the rights and obligations of parties involved in incidents posing 
potential threats to the marine environment. See Simon Allison (2015) ‘Salvage 
Companies and Protection of the Marine Environment: Time to Pay the Piper?’ (MPhil 
Dissertation submitted to the University of Western Australia). 
142 Resolution A. 950 (23). Adopted on 5 December 2003 (Agenda item 17) Maritime 
Assistance Services (MAS)  
     <http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=9043&filename=950.pdf> 
accessed 5 December 2014. In 2009, the CMI developed a Draft Instrument on Places of 
Refuge. This Declaration seeks to clarify or adumbrate the rights and obligations of 
coastal States in providing places of refuge <http://comitemaritime.org/Places-of-
Refuge/0,2733,13332,00.html>. According to Allison, supra note 141, p. 116 a major 
incentive in the CMI Declaration is that it ‘guarantees salvors a right of compensation if 
they fail to earn a reward due to the coastal State’s unreasonable refusal of a place of 
refuge.’ However, the CMI Declaration of places of refugee was not popular amongst the 
IMO Legal Committee and coastal States. Thus, it is highly unlikely that CMI Draft 
Instrument on Places of Refuge will be adopted. Generally see Allison supra note 141 
and Simon Baughen (2012) ‘Maritime Pollution and State Liability’ in Baris Soyer and 
Andrew Tettenborn (eds) Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability (Informa) p. 247. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Shaw & Tsimplis, supra note 9, p. 269. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Shaw & Tsimplis, supra note 9. 
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stricken ships to appropriate places of refuge in the UK.147 The SOSREP has 
had positive impacts on place of refuge in salvage operations in the UK. For 
example, in 2007 when the MSC Napoli which was affected by heavy flooding 
while transiting the English Channel on its way to South Africa was directed by 
the SOSREP – in consultation with the French authorities– to ground the ship on 
the beach line by Portland.148 This prompt action of the SOSREP resulted in 
minimal pollution and no loss of life was recorded.149 The action taken by the 
SOSREP was universally applauded by relevant authorities in the salvage 
industry especially representatives of the European Commission.150 
Another proposed reform in the area of port of refuge is to create maritime or 
regional (national) zones. There should be a system of regional areas (ports, safe 
havens) where distressed ships can seek refuge and receive necessary services in 
relation to human, vessel and environmental safety.151 Zoning ‘is needed together 
with supporting infrastructure, contingency planning, risk assessment, and other 
services to enable informed and effective case-by-case responses’.152 In the 
European Union, places of refuge are actively encouraged. The European 
Directive 2002/59/EC153 establishes a system wherein national authorities in 
Member States are expected to collect information or data on ship movements 
and incidents and receive applications for entry into places of refuge.154 Here, 
each State has the powers to designate the suitable places of refuge by virtue of 
Article 20 of the Directive.155  
                                           
147 Dennis Bryant, (2013) ‘Places of Refuge’ (February 2013 edition of Maritime Reporter & 
Engineering News) <http://www.marinelink.com/news/places-refuge-of351560.aspx>. 
Accessed 3 March 2013. 
148  Ibid. 
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153 Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 June 2002 
establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system and 
repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC. <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:208:0010:0010:EN:PDF>. 
Accessed: 3 March 2013. 
154 Shaw & Tsimplis, supra note 9. 
155 Art 20 of the European Directive 2002/59/EC states: 
 ‘Member States, having consulted the parties concerned, shall draw up, taking into 
account relevant guidelines by IMO, plans to accommodate, in the waters under their 
jurisdiction, ships in distress. Such plans shall contain the necessary arrangements and 
procedures taking into account operational and environmental constraints, to ensure that 
ships in distress may immediately go to a place of refuge subject to authorisation by the 
competent authority. Where the Member State considers it necessary and feasible, the 
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However, this Directive is not fool–proof. It has been criticised on the basis 
that –‘ports have no reasonable incentive to admit ships in distress. The matter is 
dominated by legal uncertainty and this increases the risk of disasters occurring 
within Maritime Lepers.’156 To mitigate the harshness of the Maritime Leper 
syndrome, it has been suggested that an international convention that localises 
the interests of the stakeholders in the salvage industry be sought or enacted.157 
In the author’s view, the two IMO Resolutions158 on places of refuge should 
serve as the foundation of any international convention that will be developed in 
the future to resolve the problem of the appropriate places of refuge in salvage 
operations and the interests of countries. This will also help in protecting the 
environment during salvage operations. 
Furthermore, due to the weaknesses in the international salvage regime with 
regards to the environment, scholars and stakeholders have advocated for the 
creation of a separate and distinct environmental salvage award.159 The 
International Salvage Union (ISU) contends that provisions of the International 
Salvage Convention on the environment should be amended because it does not 
adequately reward salvors for their efforts in protecting the environment in 
salvage operations.160 Thus, the ISU believes that the creation of a separate 
salvage award will result in significant awards for the salvors reflecting the 
benefit they provide.161 On the other hand, some stakeholders including the P&I 
Clubs (Protection & Indemnity Clubs who insure the liabilities of ship-owners) 
have argued that ‘the Special Compensation P&I Clause (SCOPIC) adequately 
remunerates a salvor and that, should a separate salvage award be created, it 
would be problematic to quantify. There is also the question of who should fund 
such an award.’162 
                                                                                                            
plans must contain arrangements for the provision of adequate means and facilities for 
assistance, salvage and pollution response.’ 
156  E. Van Hooydonk, ‘The Obligation to offer a place of refuge to a ship in distress’ in the 
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Thus, in 2012, the National Maritime Law Associations which includes the 
members of the CMI took part in the fortieth Anniversary Conference of the 
CMI in Beijing, China.163 One of the themes at the Conference was a review of 
the International Salvage Convention 1989 as enunciated by the International 
Salvage Union (hereinafter ‘ISU’).164 The major aim of the ISU was the creation 
of a new environmental salvage paradigm wherein the requirement of ‘the 
tribunal or arbitrator” was “to make an appraisal of the extent and cost of 
damage to the environment which would have occurred if the ship had not been 
salved.’165 This was in contradistinction to the prevailing connotation of 
environmental protection in salvage operations wherein arbitrators assess the 
dangers to the ships or cargo from which the salvors have rescued them which 
requires ‘an appraisal of what did not happen, but which might have 
happened.’166 The Conference delegates emphasised the difficulties in computing 
damages to the environment in hypothetical scenarios and its financial 
implications; thus it was the consensus at the Conference that protection of the 
environment –as currently enshrined in the International Salvage Convention 
1989–  should be maintained. 
Conclusion 
Strictosensu, there is no pure environmental salvage award presently in the 
International Salvage Convention 1989. However, the Convention ascribes some 
marginal protection to environment in salvage operations. Notwithstanding the 
promotion of environmental protection as enshrined in the International Salvage 
Convention, many environmental disasters by ships and other similar vessels 
still occur till date. For there to be a full environmental salvage regime, the 
International Salvage Convention 1989 should be comprehensively reformed. 
Notwithstanding the recent Beijing Conference, the International Salvage 
Convention 1989 and the environmental protection paradigm remain bedevilled 
with structural and institutional shortcomings. 
The question at the core of this paper was whether the provisions of the 
International Salvage Convention 1989 adequately incentivise salvor’s efforts in 
the course of conducting salvage operations to prevent, or at least reduce 
pollution damage? Arguably, this objective would appear to be taken for granted 
due to the decision taken at the CMI’s Beijing Conference in 2012 to reject the 
notion of a separate environmental salvage award on the grounds that the 
                                           
163 See the proceedings of the conference at the CMI Beijing conference page at 
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salvors’ had not made out a sufficiently persuasive case for the amendment of 
the Convention to accommodate such a separate award. Thus, the Beijing 
Conference is not a light at the end of the tunnel for environmental protection or 
the development of a separate or distinct environmental salvage award. 
As Professor Tanaka duly noted –in relation to the places of refuge 
conundrum– the Prestige accident in 2002 demonstrates that “sending a ship 
requiring a place of refuge back to the sea entails the risk of causing serious 
marine pollution”. 167  And this damages “the offshore environment of multiple 
coastal States and the high seas. It must [thus] be stressed that places of refuge 
for ships also relate to a common interest of the international community with 
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